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Abstract
In recent years, scholarship on international organisations (IO) has devoted increasing attention to the
relations in which IOs are embedded. In this article, we argue that the rationalist-institutionalist core
of this scholarship has been marked by agentic, repressive understandings of power and we propose an
alternative approach to power as productive in and of relations among IOs. To study productive power
in IO relations, we develop a theoretical framework centred on the concept of ‘metagovernance norms’
as perceptions about the proper ‘governance of governance’ that are shared among IOs in a governance
field. Drawing on discourse theory, we contend that metagovernance norms unfold productive power
effects, as dominant notions of how to govern well and effectively (i) fix meanings, excluding alternative
understandings and (ii) are inscribed into practices and institutions, hence reshaping inter-organisational
relations over time. To illustrate our framework, we trace metagovernance norms in discourses among
health IOs since the 1990s. We find a historical transformation from beliefs in the virtues of partnerships,
pluralisation, and innovation, towards discursive articulations that emphasise harmonisation, order, and
alignment. Moreover, we expose the productive power of metagovernance norms by showing how they
were enacted through practices and institutions in the global health field.
Keywords: International Organisations; Inter-organisational Relations; Productive Power; Discourse Analysis;
Metagovernance Norms
Introduction: Power in IO relations
Contemporary scholarly work on international organisations (IOs)1 in International Relations
(IR) is marked by a shift away from studying individual IOs towards studying relationships
© British International Studies Association 2020. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1While narrow conceptualisations of ‘international organisations’ traditionally restricted the term to formal, intergovern-
mental bodies created by states, our analysis is based on a broader understanding of IOs as formal organisations that operate
on an international level and that may count both private actors and/or governments among their founders, funders, and
members (for an excellent overview of the concept’s history and various definitions, see Clive Archer, International
Organizations (Hove, UK: Psychology Press, 2001), in particular pp. 34–40). The IOs we examine in this article therefore
encompass both more traditional intergovernmental organisations and newer ‘hybrid’ ones that have gained increasing
importance in recent decades, in global health and elsewhere. Notably, GAVI and the Global Fund belong to this latter cat-
egory of hybrid IOs. However, it should also be noted that traditional intergovernmental health IOs, such as the WHO,
increasingly depend on private funding, hence blurring any strict border between intergovernmental and hybrid IOs in global
health (see David McCoy, Sudeep Chand, and Devi Sridhar, ‘Global health funding: How much, where it comes from and
where it goes’, Health Policy and Planning, 24:6 (2009), pp. 407–17).
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and networks in which IOs are embedded. While the focus has been on IOs’ interaction with
non-governmental organisations, multinational corporations, and advocacy networks, scholars
have also begun to study the relationships among ‘peers’, that is, among two or more intergov-
ernmental organisations in a broader organisational environment or ‘field’.2 By analogy with
scholarly work on global governance in general,3 pertinent strands of these emerging research
agendas have been heavily influenced by agentic rationalist perspectives on power.4 Within
this conceptual imaginary, power becomes relevant when actors – be it IOs, IO units, individual
diplomats, or states working with or through IOs – compete for material resources, strategic
advantages, institutional mandates, and other sources deemed to generate the capacity to coerce
and control others in ways that contradict their presumed preferences or interests.5
Put in the language of relational sociology,6 IR and global governance scholars working on IOs
and inter-organisational relationships in global fields of cooperation tend to be concerned with
power within either a self-actional or an inter-actional framework – as a capacity of actors
and/or as unfolding in interactions between them.7 By contrast, transactional or productive
power is often left out of the equation.8 In our view, this constriction has profound consequences
both for what questions are asked and for what answers are found in said literature. In particular,
the narrow view on power has gone along with an often implicit ambition of scholars to contrib-
ute to the effectiveness of existing governance arrangements, rather than to uncover or question
their power effects. For instance, the breathtaking proliferation and pluralisation of actors, orga-
nisations, and programmes that the past two decades have brought about in nearly every field of
global cooperation9 has been predominantly understood in terms of dangerous, ‘ineffective’ frag-
mentation of rules and institutions. The ensuing weakening of coercive hierarchy and centralisa-
tion has been connected to an alleged emergence of conflicting ‘spheres of authority’, to
2Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg, ‘World politics and organizational fields: The case of transnational sustainability
governance’, European Journal of International Relations, 15:4 (2009), pp. 707–43.
3Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, Power in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
4As an illustration, see seminal contributions to ‘inter-organisationalism’: Joachim A. Koops and Rafael Biermann (eds),
Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), and the literature
on ‘regime complexes’; Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor, ‘The regime complex for plant genetic resources’, International
Organization, 58:2 (2004), pp. 277–309; Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier, ‘The politics of international regime complexity’,
Perspectives on Politics, 7:1 (2009), pp. 13–24.
5Rafael Biermann, ‘Towards a theory of inter-organizational networking’, The Review of International Organizations, 3:2
(2008), pp. 151–77 (pp. 170–1); James N, Rosenau, ‘Governing the ungovernable: The challenge of a global disaggregation of
authority’, Regulation & Governance, 1:1 (2007), pp. 88–97; Michael Zürn and Benjamin Faude, ‘Commentary: On fragmen-
tation, differentiation and coordination’, Global Environmental Politics, 13:3 (2013), pp. 119–30; Alter and Meunier, ‘The
politics of international regime complexity’.
6John Dewey and Arthur Bentley, Knowing and the Known (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949); Mustafa Emirbayer, ‘Manifesto
for a relational sociology’, The American Journal of Sociology, 103:2 (1997), pp. 281–317; Peeter Selg, ‘Two faces of the rela-
tional turn’, PS: Political Science & Politics, 49:1 (2016), pp. 27–31.
7See also Daniel W. Drezner, ‘The power and peril of international regime complexity’, Perspectives on Politics, 7:1 (2009),
pp. 65–70; Eyal Benvenisti and George W. Downs, ‘The empire’s new clothes: Political economy and the fragmentation of
international law’, Stanford Law Review, 60:2 (2007), pp. 595–632.
8See also Hanna Ojanen, ‘Power in inter-organizational relations’, in Koops and Biermann (eds), Palgrave Handbook of
Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics, pp. 365–88.
9From humanitarian assistance (Michael Barnett, ‘Humanitarian governance’, Annual Review of Political Science, 16
(2013), pp. 379–98), and environmental governance (Frank Biermann et al., ‘The fragmentation of global governance archi-
tectures: A framework for analysis’, Global Environmental Politics, 9:4 (2009), pp. 14–40), to the refugee regime (Alexander
Betts, ‘The refugee regime complex’, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 29:1 (2010), pp. 12–37; Alexander Betts, ‘Regime complexity
and international organizations: UNHCR as a challenged institution’, Global Governance, 19:1 (2013), pp. 69–81), biodiver-
sity, fishery (Margaret A. Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish: The Interaction between Regimes in International Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011)), water governance (Joyeeta Gupta and Claudia Pahl-Wostl, ‘Global water
governance in the context of gllobal and multilevel governance: Its need, form and challenges’, Ecology and Society, 18:4
(2013), p. 53) and food security (Matias E. Margulis, ‘The regime complex for food security: Implications for the global hun-
ger challenge’, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 19:1 (2013), pp. 53–67).
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transformations in the distribution of power and heightened competition between actors, and
hence to compliance and coordination problems.10
In this article, we make a theoretical intervention in the above literature by putting forward an
alternative understanding of power as productive in and of relations among organisations.
Specifically, we argue that productive power becomes observable in reflexive IO discourses that
encompass norms on how IO relations and the organisational fields in which IOs are embedded
should be governed. We conceptualise such historically grown perceptions of the proper ‘governance
of governance’11 as ‘metagovernance norms’.12 Further, we contend that power in IO relations with
peers and other actors is reflected both in the (temporary) fixation of meaning(s) in discourses
among IOs and in the constitutive inscription of dominant norms and interpretations in inter-
organisational practices and institutional set-ups. While our article focuses on norms as relatively
stable yet malleable social expectations, our understanding of productive power also extends to
moments of contestation and processes of meaning-negotiation in order to account for the emer-
gence and transformation of these norms. Drawing on discourse-analytical concepts and methodo-
logical strategies, we identify and apply two corresponding analytical axes to study metagovernance
norms and their productive effects empirically: (i) discursive regularities and transformations, and
(ii) constitutive inscriptions. Analysing IO relations from such a perspective, we claim, can give
us a different, fuller picture of the diverse semantic, normative, institutional orders that IOs in con-
temporary global governance are embedded in and (re)produce. Crucially, making the discursive (re)
production of such orders the object of study promises to problematise historically specific notions of
governance (in)effectiveness, to interrogate their constitutive effects and hence their entanglements
with power. Notwithstanding our article’s emphasis on the effects of normative order(s) in global
health, our theoretical framework incorporates instances of normative instability and ambiguity as
well as the possibility of contending, contemporaneous discourses, and visions. These instances
are reflected in changing vocabularies and truth claims on good global health governance and
may eventually not only overhaul pre-existing norms but also redefine what constitutes global health
governance. Our relational approach to the norms shaping global health governance thus builds on
the co-constitution of inscriptions of dominant global norms on the one hand and contentious pol-
itics and meaning-struggles targeting and transforming these inscriptions on the other.
To illustrate the applicability of this perspective, we present findings from an analysis of metago-
vernance norms, practices, and institutions among eight prominent health IOs13 since the late 1990s.
The field of global health governance often figures as a prime example for the much-researched trend
towards proliferation and pluralisation of institutional actors. Accordingly, scholarly engagement fre-
quently focuses on fragmentation, competition, and increasing complexity, and hence diagnoses a risk
for conflicts and competition fuelled by diverging motivations and rationalities held by the diverse
actors who occupy the field.14 This makes the latter a particularly interesting case for studying the
10Rosenau, ‘Governing the ungovernable’; Kenneth W. Abbott et al. (eds), International Organizations as Orchestrators
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
11Bob Jessop, ‘Meta-governance’, in Mark Bevir (ed.), The SAGE Handbook of Governance (London: SAGE Publications,
2014), p. 106.
12Anna Holzscheiter, ‘Restoring order in global health governance’, in Grzegorz Ekiert and Andrew Martin (eds), CES Papers
Open Forum (Cambridge, MA: Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 2015); Anna Holzscheiter, ‘Interorganisationale
Harmonisierung als sine qua non für die Effektivität von Global Governance? Eine soziologisch-institutionalistische Analyse
interorganisationaler Strukturen in der globalen Gesundheitspolitik’, in Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt et al. (eds), Politische
Vierteljahresschrift, Special Edition: ‘Internationale Organisationen’, 49 (2015), pp. 322–48.
13GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance (GAVI), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the Global Fund), the
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the World Bank, and the
World Health Organization (WHO).
14Michel Sidibé et al., ‘People, passion & politics: Looking back and moving forward in the governance of the AIDS
response’, Global Health Governance, 4:1 (2010), pp. 1–17; Keiko Inoue and Gili S. Drori, ‘The global institutionalization
of health as a social concern: Organizational and discursive trends’, International Sociology, 21:2 (2006), pp. 199–219.
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operation of discursive and productive rather than interactional and repressive power in IO relations.
Our empirical discussion will show how the contemporary discourse among global health IOs is
marked by a very similar imaginary to that of scholars of the field as plagued by detrimental com-
plexity, dysfunctionality, and fragmentation that is discursively intertwined with strong normative
beliefs in the necessity of order and harmony in governance.
The post-Cold War period did indeed bring about a broad array of issue-specific organisations
such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the Global Fund) and a host of
public-private partnerships in global health.15 Yet in more recent years, a wide range of new
initiatives, mechanisms, and institutions with the stated goal of constructing novel, more har-
monic and aligned kinds of inter-organisational relations have emerged. Rather than a neutral
scholarly description detached from the empirical reality of IO relations, this suggests that
norms stipulating the desirability to order and harmonise have made an imprint and productively
reshaped IO relations in global health. Tracing discourses back in time, we find that these causal
beliefs and normative predicates were preceded by a markedly different set of discursive regular-
ities around the turn of the millennium that revolved around the virtues of partnerships, plural-
isation, innovation, and market- and network-like arrangements. Moreover, we seek to show how
these contingent regularities unfolded productive, constitutive effects by reshaping practices and
institutions in the field. Here, we point to the proliferation of institutional experimentation, pri-
vatisation, and small-scale disease-specific partnerships in the post-Cold War years and the pro-
liferation of reflexive, more institutionalised attempts to coordinate, orchestrate, harmonise, and
order the field at the global level from 2003 onwards.
As we will argue in our conclusion, our analysis underlines the benefits of expanding the cur-
rent understanding of power among IOs towards a productive, transactional perspective inas-
much as health IOs’ discourses on governance undergo profound transformations over time
that have reshaped practices and institutions in the field. Our analysis is not only meant to exem-
plify a different route towards the study of power and IO relations in global (health) governance,
but also to challenge a prevailing perception of global health governance as an apolitical, technical
domain of international cooperation in which power effects are minimal.
Productive power of metagovernance norms in IO discourses on institutional order
How can we study power in the formation and transformation of IO relations? This begs the
question of how IR has looked at IOs and their relations.16 While for a long time, interest centred
on individual formal IOs, a range of recently emerging research programmes have shifted atten-
tion from single IOs towards IO relationships. One side of this spectrum features research pro-
grammes with a broadly rationalist-institutionalist theoretical outlook, with regime complexes17
and inter-organisationalism18 among their most visible representatives.19 On the other side of the
15See, for example, Joshua K. Leon, The Rise of Global Health: The Evolution of Effective Collective Action (New York: State
University of New York, 2015), pp. 117–42.
16The categorisation of more rationalist versus more constructivist approaches partially builds on Ulrich Franke,
Inter-Organizational Relations: Five Theoretical Approaches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
17Raustiala and Victor, ‘The regime complex for plant genetic resources’; Alter and Meunier, ‘The politics of international
regime complexity’; Karen J. Alter and Kal Raustiala, ‘The rise of international regime complexity’, Annual Review of Law and
Social Science, 14:1 (2018), pp. 329–49.
18Rafael Biermann, ‘Inter-organizational relations: An emerging research programme’, in Bob Reinalda (ed.), The Ashgate
Research Companion to Non-State Actors (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), pp. 173–84; Koops and Biermann (eds),
Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics.
19There are other related areas of study that examine IOs in their environments and their relations to various state and
non-state actors, including ‘orchestration’ (Abbott et al. (eds), International Organizations as Orchestrators; Kenneth
Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘International regulation without international government: Improving IO performance through
orchestration’, Review of International Organizations, 5:3 (2010), pp. 315–44), ‘fragmentation’ (Biermann et al., ‘The frag-
mentation of global governance architectures’), and ‘networks’ in governance (Christer Jönsson, ‘Interorganization theory
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spectrum, there are a number of contributions that adopt more relational, constructivist
approaches that situate IOs in their sociological environment and highlight its constitutive role
for IO relations.20 However, it would appear premature to speak of one or several clearly identi-
fiable strands of literature that present coherent alternatives to the rationalist core of the emerging
literature on IO relations.
Power through and between IOs: Extant literatures on regime complexes and
inter-organisationalism
Power is most explicitly discussed in the literature strand of regime complexes and regime com-
plexity.21 Yet, even these strands of literature, in our view, suffer from two conceptual limitations
that apply to research on IO relations at large. First, power is mostly attributed to states or private
actors and understood to be exerted through, rather than (re)produced by IOs. To illustrate this
point, the recent literature on regime complexes, institutional fragmentation, and overlap in inter-
national politics is most pertinent when considering the structural conditions that influence the
position and authority of formal IOs in larger organisational fields. However, it has so far treated
IOs as passive objects of study and attributed power only to the member states of IOs or non-state
actors inside and outside of IOs that may be empowered by complex systems of rules.22 Here, the
power of (networked) non-state and state actors lies primarily in their capacity for ‘forum linking’
(that is, integration of rule-systems) or ‘forum shopping/shifting’ (that is, fragmentation/disinte-
gration of rule-systems)23 by means of their material, ideational, and organisational resources.
Cooperative or conflictive IO-IO relationships are thus the outcome of strategic choices of
state and non-state actors operating across IOs, wielding their material and non-material
resources so as to steer IOs towards cooperation or competition.
Second, even in cases where assumptions about IOs as arenas rather than co-producers of
social order are relaxed, scholars have tended to adopt a rationalist-functionalist perspective on
the role of institutions in international politics. As a consequence, they have privileged agentic,
repressive understandings of power in their quest to explain IO behaviour, including the condi-
tions under which IOs cooperate or compete with each other (for example, consider the concept
of orchestration).24 Contemporary theories of inter-organisationalism see strategic interplays or
power asymmetries between IOs in terms of resources, knowledge, or legitimacy as the principal
driving-force behind IO-IO relations, but do not search for power outside of IOs and their inter-
relations. Forging cooperative relationships with other IOs is thus seen as a rational strategy for
IOs that are confronted, for example, with resource scarcity following technological specialisation
and international organization’, International Studies Quarterly, 30:1 (1986), pp. 39–57; Malte Brosig, ‘Overlap and interplay
between international organisations: Theories and approaches’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 18:2 (2011),
pp. 147–67). However, the schools of thought we discuss in greater detail are in our view both highly relevant within the
discipline and continue to be the subject of lively debate.
20Valbona Muzaka, ‘Linkages, contests and overlaps in the global intellectual property rights regime’, European Journal of
International Relations, 17:4 (2011), pp. 755–76; Sarah Babb and Nitsan Chorev, ‘International organizations: Loose and tight
coupling in the development regime’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 51:1 (2016), pp. 81–102.
21For a detailed discussion, see Ojanen, ‘Power in inter-organizational relations’.
22Alexander Betts, ‘Institutional proliferation and the global refugee regime’, Perspectives on Politics, 7:1 (2009) pp. 53–8;
Daniel W. Drezner, All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007); Laurence R. Helfer, ‘Regime shifting: The TRIPs agreement and new dynamics of international intellectual prop-
erty lawmaking’, Yale Journal of International Law, 29:1 (2004).
23Thomas Gehring and Benjamin Faude, ‘The dynamics of regime complexes: Microfoundations and systemic effects’,
Global Governance, 19:1 (2013), pp. 119–30; Amandine Orsini, ‘Multi-forum non-state actors: Navigating the regime com-
plexes for forestry and genetic resources’, Global Environmental Politics, 13:3 (2013), pp. 34–55; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton,
‘The power politics of regime complexity: Human rights trade conditionality in Europe’, Perspectives on Politics, 7:1
(2009), pp. 33–7.
24Abbott et al. (eds), International Organizations as Orchestrators; Abbott and Snidal, ‘International regulation without
international government’.
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and innovation, or the broadening of the IO’s mandate.25 In cases of conflict between IOs, power
is instead (often implicitly) understood as a capacity that IOs can draw upon in their pursuit to
dominate others, protect their own autonomy or alternatively as emanating from strategic (dis)
advantages in interactions between organisations.26
Power in IO relations: Towards a productive, transactional understanding
We believe that the study of IOs’ relationships and embeddedness in fields of global cooperation
has much to gain from an alternative understanding of power as productive in and of social rela-
tions among IOs. This perspective departs both from the focus on states and other actors outside
of IOs as the ‘actual’ loci of power and from the repressive, agentic conceptualisations that have so
far dominated scholarly engagement with IO relations and inter-relations. In order to grasp how
productive power unfolds, we must study discursive configurations through which such relations
become discernible, are constituted and reproduced.27 In our understanding, productive power
refers to the very emergence and (re)constitution of social relations, objects, and identities – at
the expense of other possibilities. Thereby, we link in with political and sociological theorising
that sees power as distinctly relational and as located in the constitutive (re)production of social
realities.28 In the terminology of relational sociology,29 we therefore advocate for a ‘transactional’
understanding of power. While ‘self-actional’ accounts conceptualise power as a resource or char-
acteristic of actors, ‘inter-actional’ accounts locate it in the interactions or interplay among actors.
A transactional view goes a step further in untying power from the notion of externally given,
already-constituted actors by conceiving of its operation as productive and constitutive of actors
themselves, their subjectivities and relations, as well as other social realities.30 The following sections
draw on critical norms research, metagovernance literature, and anti-essentialist discourse analysis
to develop a set of analytical proposals for how the workings of productive power in relations
among IOs can be grasped, both conceptually and empirically. Notably, we suggest turning atten-
tion to the constitutive effects of norms on ‘good’ global governance in discourses among IOs.
Metagovernance norms as relational discursive objects
To account for the unfolding of productive power effects in IO relations, we argue for an analyt-
ical focus on discursive perceptions that define what counts as ‘good’ and ‘effective’ governance in
a given organisational field, at a given moment in time.31 That is, we suggest studying how reflex-
ive beliefs about ‘good’ governance emerge and evolve over time and how they are enacted among
25Mark Ebers, The Formation of Inter-Organizational Networks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Biermann,
‘Inter-organizational relations’; Malte Brosig, ‘Regime complexity and resource dependence theory in international peace-
keeping: The example of Somalia and the Central African Republic’, in Koops and Biermann (eds), Palgrave Handbook of
Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics, pp. 447–70; Nathaniel Gest and Alexandru Grigorescu, ‘Interactions
among intergovernmental organizations in the anti-corruption realm’, The Review of International Organizations, 5:1
(2010), pp. 53–72.
26Biermann, ‘Towards a theory of inter-organizational networking’; Frank Biermann and Bernd Siebenhühner, ‘The role
and relevance of international bureaucracies: Setting the stage’, in Biermann and Siebenhühner (eds), Managers of Global
Change: The Influence of International Environmental Bureaucracies (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2009), pp. 1–14.
27David R. Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis, ‘Introducing discourse theory and political analysis’, in David R. Howarth,
Aletta J. Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis (eds), Discourse Theory and Political Analysis (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 2000), pp. 1–37.
28For seminal contributions in relational sociology, poststructuralist theorising and Actor Network Theory (ANT), see
Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known; Emirbayer, ‘Manifesto for a relational sociology’; Judith Butler, The Psychic
Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Bruno Latour, ‘The techniques of power:
The powers of association’, The Sociological Review, 32 (1984), pp. 264–80.
29Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known; Emirbayer, ‘Manifesto for a relational sociology’.
30For a detailed discussion of these distinctions, see Selg, ‘Two faces of the relational turn’.
31Dingwerth and Pattberg, ‘World politics and organizational fields’.
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IOs, hence bringing forth regularities in practices and institutional arrangements. This framework
combines the notion of metagovernance as denoting ‘second-order’, reflexive kinds of governance
practices,32 with critical, discursive approaches in IR norms research that conceptualise norms as
enacted, contingent meanings, rather than as fixed containers thereof.33 Whereas early construct-
ivist theorising on norms employed a less dynamic conceptualisation of norms as relatively stable
‘standards of appropriate behaviour for actors within a given identity’,34 these newer theories
emphasise that norms ‘do not speak for themselves’ but are only attributed with meaning through
enactments in practices as they unfold in historically, politically, geographically, and institution-
ally specific social contexts.35 At the same time, contemporary theories on norms as dynamic
processes rather than ‘things’ point to practices of contestation as the major explanatory factor
for shifts and ruptures in social expectations and thus as drivers of potential norm transform-
ation. Therefore, while our empirical analysis emphasises the ordering effects of productive
power in the area of global health, it will also expose instances of normative instability and con-
testation indicating normative transformation. In that sense, IOs’ collaborative practices in global
health are not only reflective of larger metagovernance norms, but IOs themselves emerge as sites
for the formation and transformation of norms on good global governance and as co-producers
of social order.
In order to get at how productive power unfolds through constitutive meaning (re)production
we propose to focus on a specific kind of reflexive norm that is concerned with how governance
itself ought to be governed – that is, with the ‘governance of governance’.36 We therefore use the
term ‘metagovernance norms’ to denote historically grown perceptions about how governance
ought to be pursued that are (re)produced in discursive practices among IOs.37 Thereby, we
offer two distinct conceptual contributions that advance critical, discursive approaches to inter-
national norms. First, we introduce an analytical focus on reflexive perceptions that are related to
the proper conduct of governance as such. Second, we argue for situating the analysis of norm
32Jessop, ‘Meta-governance’; for a more detailed discussion of the literature, see Anna Holzscheiter, Thurid Bahr, and
Laura Pantzerhielm, ‘Emerging governance architectures in global health: Do metagovernance norms explain inter-
organizational convergence?’, Politics & Governance, Special Issue: ‘Supranational Institutions and Governance in an Era
of Uncertain Norms’, 4:3 (2016); Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing, ‘Theoretical approaches to metagovernance’, in Eva
Sørensen and Jacob Torfing (eds), Theories of Democratic Network Governance (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007),
pp. 169–82.
33Antje Wiener, ‘Contested meanings of norms: A research framework’, Comparative European Politics, 5:1 (2007), pp. 1–17;
Antje Wiener, ‘Introduction: Contestation as norm-generative social practice’, in Antje Wiener (ed.), A Theory of Contestation
(Heidelberg: Springer, 2014), pp. 1–14; Antje Wiener and Uwe Puetter, ‘The quality of norms is what actors make of it: Critical
constructivist research on norms’, Journal of International Law and International Relations, 5:1 (2009), pp. 1–16.
34Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, International
Organization, 52:4 (1998), pp. 887–917 (p. 891).
35Antje Wiener, ‘Enacting meaning-in-use: Qualitative research on norms and international relations’, Review of
International Studies, 35:1 (2009), pp. 175–93 (pp. 179–80); Annika Björkdahl, ‘Norms in international relations: Some con-
ceptual and methodological reflections’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 15:1 (2002), pp. 9–23; Stephan
Engelkamp et al., ‘In der Sprechstunde: Wie (kritische) Normenforschung ihre Stimme wiederfinden kann’, Zeitschrift für
Internationale Beziehungen, 19:2 (2012), pp. 101–28; Mona Lena Krook and Jacqui True, ‘Rethinking the life cycles of inter-
national norms: The United Nations and the global promotion of gender equality’, European Journal of International
Relations, 18:1 (2012), pp. 103–27; Amitav Acharya, ‘How ideas spread: Whose norms matter? Norm localization and insti-
tutional change in Asian regionalism’, International Organization, 58:2 (2004), pp. 239–75; Susanne Zwingel, ‘How do norms
travel? Theorizing international women’s rights in transnational perspective’, International Studies Quarterly, 56:1 (2012),
pp. 115–29; Maria Martin de Almagro, ‘Lost boomerangs, the rebound effect and transnational advocacy networks: A dis-
cursive approach to norm diffusion’, Review of International Studies, 44:4 (2018), pp. 672–93; Judith Renner, Discourse,
Normative Change and the Quest for Reconciliation in Global Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013);
Anna Holzscheiter, Children’s Rights in International Politics: The Transformative Power of Discourse (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
36Jessop, ‘Meta-governance’, p. 106; see also Sørensen and Torfing, ‘Theoretical approaches to metagovernance’.
37See also Wiener, ‘Contested meanings of norms’; Holzscheiter, ‘Interorganisationale Harmonisierung als sine qua non
für die Effektivität von Global Governance?’.
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(re)production and effects within a discourse-analytical framework that is concerned with how
productive power unfolds among organisations who occupy a given governance field.
Analysing norms from a decidedly discourse-analytical perspective, we argue, is pivotal to addres-
sing the delicate relationship between norms and power. It has three interconnected advantages:
firstly, it allows for consideration of how norms are attributed with meaning through their rela-
tions with other discursive entities; secondly, it highlights how meaning-making is inevitably pre-
mised on discursive exclusion; and thirdly, it emphasises how the attribution of a sense of
naturalness to a given norm in a given social context is underpinned by specific knowledge for-
mations. In other words, our framework aims to shed light on how metagovernance norms are
entangled in the unfolding of constitutive power effects that inscribe themselves and bring forth
regularities in social relations.
Siding with an anti-essentialist perspective that understands social realities as emerging from
contingent processes of (re)production,38 we take ‘discourse’ to denote a formation of knowledge
that delineates the borders of what is reasonably speakable in a given historical, sociopolitical
context.39 As a consequence, we understand identities and institutions of the social world as
outcomes of contingent, yet productive discursive constitution and inscription, as contingent
on the exclusion of other possibilities and as being constantly reproduced in meaning-endowed
practices.40 In our view, this approach is well suited to investigating the constitutive effects of
power. It goes beyond the Weberian imaginary of power as competition and coercion between
given actors, instead shedding light on the very emergence of sociodiscursive objects, subjects,
practices, and institutions.
The discourse-analytical approach advocated here underlines the necessity of considering how
the productive power of metagovernance norms is made possible through the discursive context
in which they emerge, to inquire into their relationship with other discursive objects and causal
beliefs on governance. More specifically, the working of productive power can be located in the
temporal, partial fixation of meaning(s)41 in IO discourses, as well as in the inscription of dom-
inant norms and interpretations in inter-organisational practices and institutional set-ups.42 In
order to concretise this theoretical perspective, the next two sections develop conceptual tools
along two analytical axes: (i) discursive regularities and transformations and (ii) constitutive
inscriptions. Rather than constituting separate ontological phenomena, these axes can be under-
stood as complementary analytical strategies. As a more fine-grained guide for the interpretation
of empirical materials, they help to shed light on how metagovernance norms unfold productive
power effects in inter-organisational relations.
Discursive regularities and transformations
To grasp the historico-political specificity of metagovernance norms, our first analytical axis
addresses regularities and transformations in the discursive field. Devoting attention to how
taken-for-granted assumptions about governance have evolved over time is useful in studying
productive power in IO relations as it helps us unearth how meanings have been fixed and
38Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London:
Verso, 2001); Oliver Marchart, ‘Politik und ontologische Differenz. Zum “strengen Philosophischen” am Werk Ernesto
Laclaus’, in Martin Nonhoff (ed.), Diskurs – radikale Demokratie – Hegemonie (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2007), pp. 103–22.
39Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language (New York: Vintage Books, 2010 [orig.
pub. 1972]), pp. 55, 79–89; Michel Foucault, Die Ordnung des Diskurses (Frankfurt am Main, 1974); Michel Foucault,
‘Nietzsche, genealogy, history’, in Donald F. Bouchard (ed.), Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and
Interviews (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 139–64.
40Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, p. 49.
41Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London:
Verso, 2001 [orig. pub. 1985]); Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language.
42Tomas Marttila, ‘Post-foundational discourse analysis: A suggestion for a research program’, Forum Quantitative
Sozialforschung/Forum Qualitative Social Research, 16:3 (2015).
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what alternative conceptions were excluded as a result. As normative propositions in reflexive dis-
courses on governance, metagovernance norms are particularly entangled with ‘problems’ that
governance needs to solve and perceptions about how governance can be effectively pursued
and organised. In other words, we can study how prevalent terms in IO discourses, such as policy
‘harmonisation’, inter-agency ‘coordination’ or ‘alignment’ are attributed with meaning and
emerge as understandable propositions through discursive patterns that relate them to other
terms. Against such a backdrop, our empirical analysis of metagovernance norms maps juxtapo-
sitions, equations, contrastations, and groupings of discursive elements within their concrete con-
text of interest.43 Moreover, empirical analysis can and ought to move beyond the synchronic
identification of metagovernance norms and their discursive relations by engaging in diachronic
comparisons of discursive regularities and ruptures. By bringing to light discursive transforma-
tions and discontinuities, our diachronic analysis identifies the emergence of new normatively
connoted notions and the forgetting, demise, and exclusion of previously powerful ones.44
Constitutive inscriptions
As a second analytical axis, we analyse how productive power unfolds as dominant metagover-
nance norms and interpretations inscribe themselves into organisational fields that IOs populate.
We therefore ask: how do perceptions about how governance can and ought to be pursued shape
concrete policies and practices among organisations, as well as the institutional constellation of
the field? At the same time, we seek to identify moments of contestation and ambiguity over
what constitutes ‘good’ global health governance as reflected in changing or co-existing practices
and policies. From our perspective, contestation at the level of cooperative practices between IOs
therefore becomes crucial in order to account for transformations in these powerful patterns: it
forms the quicksand that eventually might lead to shifts in perspective and crystallise into yet
another powerful social convention. This can occur in different ways: firstly, through the shifting
prominence of existing practices and institutional arrangements among organisations; secondly,
by means of the establishment of new (kinds of) organisations and inter-organisational fora; and
thirdly through the redefinition or dissolution of existing organisations.
Selection of empirical materials: IO annual reports and policy documents
Our results are derived from a synchronic and diachronic discourse analysis that followed the
analytical axes outlined above as an interpretative lens for studying changing discursive patterns,
IO practices, and institutional settings across time. We originally collected and studied a corpus of
all available annual reports published by eight health IOs45 since the 1970s. For the purpose of
this article, we zoom in on a shorter period from the mid 1990s to the mid 2010s to leave
space for an in-depth examination of our findings. The selected IOs span different types and gen-
erations: they include older and younger inter-governmental bodies from within and outside the
United Nations, as well as so-called hybrid IOs that were formed more recently, typically by coa-
litions of public and private founders. We choose to study annual reports as they constitute a rich,
comprehensive account of IOs’ activities and institutional entanglements during the preceding
year(s), while also providing for comparability across time. Drawing on well-established
43See also Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, pp. 38, 44–5; Laclau and Mouffe,
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, pp. 109, 112; Brigitte Kerchner, ‘“Endlich Ordnung in der Werkzeugkiste”: Zum
Potential der Foucault’schen Diskursanalyse für die Politikwissenschaft’, in Brigitte Kerchner and Silke Schneider,
Foucault: Diskursanalyse der Politik (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006).
44Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, genealogy, history’; Martin Saar, ‘Understanding genealogy: History, power, and the self’, Journal of
the Philosophy of History, 2 (2008), pp. 295–314; William Walters, Governmentality: Critical Encounters (London: Routledge,
2012).
45See fn. 12.
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conventions in discourse-analytical methodology, we also extended this core corpus of materials
inductively by including further policy documents that annual reports referred to (‘inter-
textuality’) and we chose to collect additional material on selected examples to illustrate our the-
oretical points more aptly and in more depth (for instance on the Health Systems Funding
Platform).
In the following, we make use of the above framework and methods to inquire into changing
metagovernance norms, their discursive embeddedness and productive power effects in global
health since the 1990s. While our theoretical proposals can be applied to the relations of any
set of actors/speakers that engage in reflexive discourses on ‘good’ (global) governance, in the fol-
lowing, we focus on discourses among global health IOs in seeking to illustrate the proposals’
empirical fruitfulness.
Metagovernance norms, institutional practices, and changing constellations in global
health governance
Pertinent scholarly engagement with global health governance typically paints a picture of actor
proliferation and pluralisation, fragmentation and complexity, associating the latter with harmful
conflict and competition among the diverse actors who occupy the field.46 The gist of these most
widely told narratives on global health governance is that health has evolved from a slim govern-
ance cosmos with the WHO at its centre into a colourful, bedazzling mosaic of actors, rules,
institutions, and networks.47 Not only has the substance of health politics changed dramatically –
with the WHO covering a wide range of issues beyond traditional medicine from eHealth to the
migration of health workers and beyond – but the number of intergovernmental and non-
governmental agencies concerned with matters of global health has increased exponentially since
the 1990s and the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the year 2000.48
As a consequence of this plurality, the field appears to be plagued by competition between neatly
separable IOs, states, private donors, and hybrid issue-specific partnerships who seek to extend
their capacity to dictate others’ behaviour. Power among IOs in global health therefore seems to
play out in protracted strategic combats between organisations – over divisions of labour, resources,
agenda setting, etc. – that result in duplication of operational activities, parallel funding streams, and
normative incoherence, hence first and foremost constituting a problem for governance effectiveness.
This second part of our article tells a different story of power in global health governance by
focusing on the emergence and effects of contemporary metagovernance norms in reflexive dis-
courses among IOs. In particular, we show how such perceptions have evolved over time and
crystallised into powerful inscriptions that become observable in contemporary inter-
organisational practices and institutions. Our diachronic analysis of IO-IO relations in global
health also allows us to identify processes of contestation and normative instability and, thus,
to trace major transformations in global health governance. We first show how metagovernance
norms in current discourses among health IOs are marked by a presumed need for harmonisa-
tion, order, and alignment. Thereafter, we trace these discourses back in time, showing how they
46Sidibé et al., ‘People, passion & politics’; Inoue and Drori, ‘The global institutionalization of health as a social concern’.
47Jan Wouters and Bart De Meester, ‘Safeguarding coherence in global policy-making on trade and health: The
EU-WHO-WTO triangle’, International Organizations Law Review, 2:2 (2005), pp. 295–335; Jon Cohen, ‘The new world
of global health’, Science, 311:5758 (2006), pp. 162–7; David Fidler, ‘Architecture amidst anarchy: Global health’s quest
for governance’, Global Health Governance, 1:1 (2007); Sidibé et al., ‘People, passion & politics’.
48Tore Godal, ‘Opinion: Do we have the architecture for health aid right? Increasing global aid effectiveness’, Nature
Reviews Microbiology, 3:11 (2005), pp. 899–903; George J. Schieber et al., ‘Financing global health: Mission unaccomplished:
Better-quality aid and more coordination among donor and recipient countries are critical to improving aid effectiveness’,
Health Affairs, 26:4 (2007), pp. 921–34; Sophie Harman, Global Health Governance (New York: Routledge, 2012); Leon,
The Rise of Global Health; Jon Lidén, ‘The Grand Decade for Global Health: 1998–2008’, Center on Global Health
Security Working Group Papers (London: Chatham House, 2013); Chelsea Clinton and Devi Sridhar, Governing Global
Health: Who Runs the World and Why? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
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were preceded by contrasting discursive regularities that revolved around the virtues of competi-
tion, pluralisation, partnerships, and innovation. Moreover, we illustrate how these discourses and
normative beliefs inscribed themselves and shaped the organisational field. Our conceptual and
analytical framework of discourses of metagovernance also allows us to embed observed transfor-
mations in interorganisational practices and institutional set-ups in larger transitions towards
changing normative orders.
Contemporary taken-for-granted truth claims on governance: Detrimental complexity
and the need for order
Looking at the discussion on the challenges for global health governance as it has been led among
academics and practitioners for the last decade, three regularities become obvious: first, the land-
scape of global health is routinely portrayed as excessively fragmented and tremendously com-
plex. As one prominent global health scholar puts it ‘today’s global health landscape is
increasingly complex, populated by more than one hundred organisations, often with competing
programs and priorities’.49 Secondly, this complexity is associated with collective ineffectiveness,
that is, underperformance and dysfunctionality of the global health governance complex. And
thirdly, this underperformance justifies the ritualistic call for restoration of order and the creation
of some sort of identifiable institutional architecture.50 The contemporary discourse on how glo-
bal health should be governed and by whom, thus, is marked by a strong unity among IOs, policy
analysts and public health experts in the search for an appropriate ‘architecture’ that embeds the
actions of individual organisations in a more coherent set of rules and oversight, while at
the same time promising better collective outcomes. The international debate in the wake of
the Ebola outbreaks in 2014 is a case in point, as it was marked by unanimous calls for more
order and large-scale coordination rather than further experimentation with small, punctuated,
issue-specific initiatives and partnerships.51 A systematic analysis of policy documents and
annual reports issued by influential IOs in the field of health52 reveals a remarkably homogenous
perception of complexity as detrimental.53 This causal belief that differentiation and fragmenta-
tion – of actors and the rule-systems defining the field of ‘global health’ – are ineffective and dys-
functional is used to support calls for centralisation, and integration in which typically already
powerful agencies are presented as the logical candidates for governing coordination and
49Lawrence O. Gostin, Global Health Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), p. 429.
50Dina Balabanova et al., ‘What can global health institutions do to help strengthen health systems in low income
countries’, Health Policy Research and Systems, 8:22 (2010), pp. 1–11; Riegen G. Biesma et al., ‘The effects of global health
initiatives on country health systems: A review of the evidence from HIV/AIDS control’, Health Policy Plan, 24:4 (2009),
pp. 239–52; Margaret Chan et al., ‘Meeting the demand for results and accountability: A call for action on health data
from eight global health agencies’, PLoS Med, 7:1 (2010); Schieber et al., ‘Financing global health’, pp. 921–34; Julio
Frenk, ‘Strengthening Health Systems: Towards New Forms of Global Cooperation’, Meeting on Global Health and the
United Nations (Atlanta, GA: Carter Center, 2008); Julio Frenk, ‘The global health system: Strengthening national health sys-
tems as the next step for global progress’, PLoS Med, 7:1 (2010); Wolfgang Hein, ‘“Global Health Governance” –
zukunftsfähige Architektur eines globalen Gesundheitssystems?’, GIGA Focus, 7 (2006); Badara Samb et al., ‘An assessment
of interactions between global health initiatives and country health systems’, The Lancet, 373:9681 (2009), pp. 2137–69;
Fidler, ‘Architecture amidst anarchy’; Leon, The Rise of Global Health.
51Lawrence O. Gostin and Eric A. Friedman, ‘Ebola: A crisis in global health leadership’, The Lancet, 384:9951 (2014),
pp. 1323–5.
52Besides pertinent policy documents, grey and academic literature, we compiled and reviewed a full set of annual reports
by GAVI, the Global Fund, UNAIDS, UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, the World Bank, and WHO between 1970 and 2013. This
article presents results since the early 1990s.
53For example: UNAIDS, ‘Report of the Seventeenth Meeting of the UNAIDS Programme Coordinating Board in Geneva,
27–29 June 2005’ (Geneva: UNAIDS, 2005), p. 15; WHO, ‘The World Health Report 2008: Primary Health Care, Now More
Than Ever’ (Geneva: WHO, 2008), p. 108; UNDP, ‘Annual Report 2007: Making Globalization Work for All’ (New York:
UNDP, 2007), p. 19; UNDP, ‘Annual Report 2013/2014: New Partnerships for Development’ (New York: UNDP, 2014), p. 6.
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harmonisation.54 In the contemporary discourse among health IOs, there are also references to
health in general and specific health issues (especially HIV) as being of a complex nature.
Such issue complexity is typically seen to require functional differentiation and harmonisation
among organisations at the same time.55 Complexity is also used to justify demands for effective
solutions based on evidence and the generation, processing, and sharing of ever-greater amounts
of health data.56 Complexity as a discursive object emerges also in the context of increasing
demands for expertise from a wide variety of professional backgrounds.57
These widely shared causal beliefs thus support visions of good global health governance as
complicated, overcrowded, and ineffective. Such narratives in turn serve to justify normative
beliefs in the need for synchronisation, harmonisation, and coordination of a range of actors
and agencies geared towards efficient use of resources and effective collective solutions and out-
comes.58 By way of juxtaposition and contrast, the interactions between different spheres of social
and political life and the inevitable frictions resulting from the encounter between different social
orders and rule systems are typically presented as ‘dysfunctional’ rather than productive, thus
calling for more expertise and enhanced efforts to coordinate and harmonise interactions, for
instance by creating institutional arrangements between IOs. Taken together, these contemporary
discursive regularities unfold productive power effects, as they circumscribe what counts and what
makes sense as a reasonable proposal for improving and (re)ordering the global health field – and
what does not. Moreover, as we seek to illustrate in the next two sections, a look into the recent
archives of inter-organisational discourse and practice in global health governance reveals, first, a
relative novelty and hence non-necessity of these contemporary truth claims and, second, points
to shifting institutional arrangements and practices in congruence with these normative
transformations.
Historical emergence and contingencies: From plural, networked, and competitive to
orderly, coherent, and synchronised
The contingency and borders of contemporary discursive regularities become understandable
only by tracing their historical emergence. Our diachronic perspective on discourses among
health IOs reveals the contemporary search for a global institutional master design to be a rela-
tively novel phenomenon that marks a departure from earlier phases of consolidated and pat-
terned inter-organisational discourses and practices. From the beginning, the WHO had
organisational ties predominantly with the UN, its specialised agencies, funds,59 and
54UNDP, ‘Annual Report 2009/2010: Delivering on Commitments’ (New York: UNDP, 2010), p. 35; WHO, ‘The World
Health Report 2013: Research for Universal Health Coverage’ (Geneva: WHO, 2013), p. 108; WHO, ‘The World Health
Report 2008’, p. 85.
55UNAIDS, ‘The First Ten Years’ (Geneva: UNAIDS, 2008); Ilona Kickbusch and David Gleicher, ‘Smart Governance for
Health and Well-Being: The Evidence’ (Geneva: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014).
56WHO, ‘The World Health Report 2004: Changing History’ (Geneva: WHO, 2004), p. 43; UNAIDS, ‘UNAIDS Annual
Report: Making the Money Work’ (Geneva: UNAIDS, 2006), p. 33.
57WHO, ‘Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for Economic Development. Report by the Commission on
Macroeconomics and Health’ (Geneva: WHO, 2001), pp. 129–39; UNAIDS, ‘Report of the Executive Director, 2004–
2005’ (Geneva: UNAIDS, 2005), p. 9.
58Kent Buse and Gill Walt, ‘Aid coordination for health sector reform: A conceptual framework for analysis and assess-
ment’, Health Policy, 38:3 (1996), pp. 173–87; Ilona Kickbusch et al., ‘Addressing global health governance challenges through
a new mechanism: The proposal for a Committee C of the World Health Assembly’, The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics,
38:3 (2010), pp. 550–63; Deborah Rugg et al., ‘Efforts in collaboration and coordination of HIV/AIDS monitoring and evalu-
ation: Contributions and lessons of two U.S. government agencies in a global partnership’, New Directions for Evaluation, 103
(2004), pp. 65–79; Neil Spicer et al., ‘National and subnational HIV/AIDS coordination: Are global health initiatives closing
the gap between intent and practice?’, Globalization and Health, 6 (2010), pp. 1–16.
59Its closest collaborator from the outset was UNICEF – inter-organisational relations between the two bodies were insti-
tutionalised through a Joint Committee on Health Policy and a set of principles that should govern their cooperative relation-
ships in 1949.
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programmes, but also with bilateral agencies and the private sector (such as the Rockefeller
Foundation).60 In the Cold War era, inter-organisational relations consisted largely of joint com-
mittees for specific purposes, integrated personnel management, information exchange, or the
coordination of statistical services.61 While inter-organisational relationships between IOs were
thus always part and parcel of international health politics, an increasing focus on institutional
experimentation, privatisation, and small-scale disease-specific partnership prevailed in the
post-Cold War years. Since the 1990s, but particularly around the turn of the last millennium,
a new spirit of ‘innovation’ characterised global health governance, with a move from system-wide
approaches (or sector-wide approaches in World Bank terminology) to disease-specific, targeted
interventions, mostly in collaboration with the private sector (for example, business, private foun-
dations, and civil society at large). Numerous public-private partnerships for health and other
global initiatives involving governmental and non-governmental actors emerged in this period,
among them well-known partnerships such as the Roll Back Malaria Initiative or the Drugs
for Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDi).62 As other studies have shown, over time health became
embedded into new discursive patterns. While there is some divergence among scholars, they
agree that understandings of health based in security, economics and public health or biomedi-
cine have been particularly influential, next to more marginal ones such as (human) rights-based
and charity-based understandings.63 These observably changing discourses on good global health
governance also affected the substance of policymaking and the emergence of new issues and
agendas. Most importantly, they underpinned a perceived need to broaden the range of actors
considered indispensable for global health governance – from military actors to private enter-
prises, consultancy firms and philanthropies, to human rights activists and communities and
individuals affected by specific health issues and diseases.
Adding to these findings, our discourse-analytical survey of IO policy documents and annual
reports points to historical transformation not only in the framing of health as such, but also in
the reflexive causal and normative beliefs on how to properly govern the global health field – that
is, in dominant metagovernance norms. In the 1990s and around the turn of the millennium, we
found that discourses among health IOs were marked by beliefs in the effectiveness of market-like
exchange, networks, and the inclusion of private actors in governance mechanisms and arrange-
ments.64 Crucially, markets, networks, and public-private partnerships were discursively consti-
tuted as effective and normatively desirable ways of governing through juxtaposition with
hierarchical and intentional modes of steering, such as state regulation and bureaucracies,
which were deemed inefficient and outdated. To illustrate, the WHO 1999 Annual Report
60See also Theodore M. Brown et al., ‘The World Health Organization and the transition from “international” to “global”
public health’, American Journal of Public Health, 96:1 (2006), pp. 62–72.
61WHO, ‘The Work of WHO 1973: Annual Report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the
United Nations’ (Geneva: WHO, 1974), p. 103; WHO, ‘The World Health Report 1998: Life in the 21st Century, A
Vision for All. Report of the Director-General’ (Geneva: WHO, 1998), p. 191; WHO, ‘The Work of WHO 1976–77:
Biennial Report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the United Nations’ (Geneva: WHO,
1978), pp. 15–16; WHO, ‘The Work of WHO 1982–83: Biennial Report of the Director-general to the World Health
Assembly and to the United Nations’ (Geneva: WHO, 1984), p. 129.
62Lidén, ‘The Grand Decade for Global Health’; Andrew Cooper et al., Governing Global Health: Challenge, Response,
Innovation (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2007).
63David Stuckler and Martin McKee, ‘Five metaphors about global-health policy’, The Lancet, 372:9633 (2008), pp. 95–7;
Colin McInnes et al., ‘Framing global health: The governance challenge’, Global Public Health, 7:2 (2012), pp. 83–94.
64For example: UNFPA, ‘United Nations Population Fund 1995 Report’ (New York: UNFPA, 1995), p. 14; UNICEF,
‘UNICEF Annual Report 1996’ (Geneva: UNICEF, 1996), pp. 8, 34; WHO, ‘The World Health Report 1999: Making a
Difference’ (Geneva: WHO, 1999), pp. x, xi, 7–10, 14–15, 18; WHO, ‘The World Health Report 1995: Bridging the Gaps.
Report of the Director-General’ (Geneva: WHO, 1995), p. 63; World Bank, ‘The World Bank Annual Report 1990’
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 1990), pp. 48–9; World Bank, ‘The World Bank Annual Report 1996’ (Washington, DC:
World Bank, 1996), pp. 61–3; World Bank, ‘The World Bank Annual Report 1989’ (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989).
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bespeaks the need to ‘recognize the limits of government’,65 ‘harness the energies and resources of
the private sector and civil society’,66 and ‘be more innovative in creating influential partner-
ships’.67 As we will show in the next section, such beliefs informed the creation of new organisa-
tions with market-shaping ambitions, such as GAVI, and made the partnership model of newly
emerging health IOs, including GAVI and the Global Fund, appear as logical, effective,
state-of-the-art set-ups. The proliferating number of public-private partnerships and hybrid
IOs in global health at the time can therefore be conceived of as a product of IO discourses
that constituted privatisation as a metagovernance norm. At the same time, once established,
these hybrid IOs rearticulate the same beliefs on governance that underpinned their own coming
into existence, hence becoming co-producers of such regularities.
Such a discourse on governance contrasts quite sharply with the period from the early 2000s to
the 2010s – a period in which IOs increasingly articulated a perceived need for new initiatives for
high-level harmonisation and comprehensive institutional attempts at ordering relations among
actors. The emergence of such novel articulations in our corpus allows us to depict this period as
one of normative instability and ambiguity, with continuous support for large-scale privatisation
of global health governance on the one hand and, on the other, the growing influence of a dis-
course marked by a vocabulary of harmonisation, coordination, coherence, and inter-agency col-
laboration.68 We thus observe the proliferation of references to harmonisation as a core value in
global health governance – harmonisation understood as large-scale initiatives that seek to span
all international and transnational actors and networks relevant to a specific issue or cluster of
issues. The emergence of harmonisation as a metagovernance norm is, for example, reflected
in core policy documents and working papers of the most important IOs in the field of HIV/
AIDS (UNAIDS, World Bank, Global Fund, and WHO), in which they outline their individual
or collective perspective on inter-organisational coherence and coordination.69 As an illustration,
a report issued by the Global Fund in 2005 recorded ‘potentials’, ‘challenges’, appropriate ‘instru-
ments’ and ‘support’ for ‘harmonization’, understood as ‘refer[ing] to efforts to streamline and
coordinate approaches between multilateral institutions’.70 In a similar vein, a UNAIDS report
from the same year sought to evaluate the ‘progress’ achieved among global health IOs and to
identify further ‘efforts’ that were required to ‘enhance harmonization of policies, procedures
and practices’ in various areas of shared activity (for example, at ‘the country level’, in
65WHO, ‘The World Health Report 1999’, p. iv.
66Ibid., p. x.
67Ibid., p. xi.
68Laura Pantzerhielm, Anna Holzscheiter, and Thurid Bahr, ‘Governing effectively in a complex world? How metagover-
nance norms and changing repertoires of knowledge shape IO discourses on institutional order in global health’, Cambridge
Review of International Affairs, Online First (2019), available at: {https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1678112}; Thurid
Bahr, Anna Holzscheiter, and Laura Pantzerhielm, ‘Understanding regime complexes through a practice lens: Repertoires
of inter-organizational practices in global health’, accepted for publication in Global Governance: A Review of
Multilateralism and International Organizations (forthcoming, 2020).
69Above all: GFATM, ‘Harmonization of Global Fund Programs and Donor Coordination: Four Case Studies with a Focus
on HIV/AIDS’ (Geneva: GFATM, 2005); OECD, ‘Progress and Challenges in Aid Effectiveness: What Can We Learn from the
Health Sector?’ (Paris: OECD, Working Party on Aid Effectiveness/Task Team on Health as a Tracer Sector, 2011); Shakow,
‘Global Fund – World Bank HIV/AIDS Programs Comparative Advantage Study’ (Geneva: GFATM/World Bank, 2006);
UNAIDS, ‘Implementation of the Global Task Team Recommendations Update Paper’ (Geneva: UNAIDS, 2005);
UNAIDS, ‘Memorandum of Understanding: UNAIDS and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria’
(Geneva: UNAIDS, 2008); UNAIDS, ‘Maximizing Returns on Investments: UNAIDS Support to Countries to Make
Global Fund Money Work’ (Geneva: UNAIDS, 2011); World Bank, ‘The World Bank’s Commitment to HIV/AIDS in
Africa: Our Agenda for Action 2007–2011’ (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008); WHO, ‘Maximizing Positive Synergies
between Health Systems and Global Health Initiatives’ (Geneva: WHO, 2009); GFATM and World Bank HIV/AIDS
Program, ‘Comparative Advantage Study’ (Geneva/Washington: GFATM/World Bank, 2006); GFATM et al., ‘Joint
Coordination Meeting on HIV/AIDS’ (Washington: GFATM/PEPFAR/World Bank, 2006).
70GFATM, ‘Harmonization of Global Fund Programs and Donor Coordination: Four Case Studies with a Focus on HIV/
AIDS’ (Geneva: GFATM, 2005), p. 5.
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‘procurement policies and procedures’, and in ‘joint monitoring and evaluation’).71 Since then,
calls for more coherence, architecture, and ‘harmony’ in global health governance became com-
monplace among global health agencies and influential commentators.72 Yet, these contemporary
truth claims emerged quite recently as the product of a reorientation towards visions of good glo-
bal health governance as orderly, coherent, and synchronised, rather than plural, competitive, and
differentiated.
Our empirical analysis of core policy documents and annual reports of eight influential health
IOs evidences how the growing influence of harmonisation as a metagovernance norm in global
health was intertwined with transformations in more encompassing international standards,
before the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD). The PD includes harmonisation
among its five principles for improved foreign aid, requesting that ‘donor countries coordinate,
simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication’.73 It was supported, among others,
by the eight IOs we researched. The principles are meant to serve as the normative basis for
good development cooperation. Studying metagovernance norms by looking at how health IOs
have responded to the Paris Declaration in their discursive practices permits us to draw two
important conclusions: firstly, that all major IOs in health have subscribed and continue to sub-
scribe to the normative demands of the Paris Declaration. Secondly, they have also changed their
organisational policies and practices accordingly (see next section). The strategies and visions for
effective global health governance articulated by these major health IOs show that they value
coordination and coherence between IOs as the backbone of more legitimate and effective global
governance.74
As these research findings suggest, a look at the emergence, effects and transformation of
metagovernance norms in the field of global health helps us identify the strings that hold the
many pieces of a seemingly cacophonous orchestra together. Studying discourses on good global
health governance allows us to capture historically specific regularities in the discursive field that
IOs reproduce and inhabit. Our findings thus allow us to break with a powerful contemporary
narrative of global health governance as a fragmented and incoherent array of actors, rules,
and institution. While a look at the number of global partnerships and initiatives that have
emerged in the past 25 years certainly allures one to diagnose that global health is out of control,
upon closer inspection we are able to detect shared discursive imaginaries among presumable
adversaries of how the field should be governed and rendered more effective, in spite of the plur-
ality of actors, rules, and perspectives. Rather than constituting a space of competition and
exchange of different epistemic or political horizons, the plethora of large global networks, part-
nerships, and inter-organisational initiatives in global health – that make up the contemporary
landscape in which IOs and their relations are embedded – displays a homogeneity in a mixture
of technocratic and managerial vocabularies revolving around evidence, performance, efficiency,
and historically variable ‘governance effectiveness’ terminologies that are shared across IOs and
other actors. These discursive regularities point to the productive power that metagovernance
71UNAIDS, ‘Implementation of the Global Task Team Recommendations Update Paper’ (Geneva: UNAIDS, 2005), pp. 6,
4, 7.
72Dean T. Jamison et al., ‘Global health 2035: A world converging within a generation’, The Lancet, 382:9908 (2015),
pp. 1898–1955; Marco Schäferhoff et al., ‘Analysing Proposals for Reform of the Global Health Architecture’, Research
Paper (London: Chatham House, 2015).
73OECD, ‘Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness’ (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2005), available at: {https://doi.org/10.1787/
9789264098084-en}; OECD, ‘Accra Agenda for Action’ (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2008), available at: {https://doi.org/10.
1787/9789264098107-en}.
74See, for example, PEPFAR, ‘The Power of Partnerships: Third Annual Report to Congress on PEPFAR’ (Washington:
PEPFAR, 2007); UNAIDS, ‘UNAIDS Annual Report’; European Commission, ‘Donor Coordination’ (2013), available at:
{http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/donor-coordination/index_en.htm} accessed 20 January 2019; GFATM,
‘Improving Effectiveness: Information Note’ (Geneva: GFATM, 2010).
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norms unfold as temporal fixations of what ‘good’ governance of global health means and how it
can be pursued.
Changing inter-organisational practices and institutional set-ups: Vertical partnerships,
experimentation, and the proliferation of ‘synchronized architectures’
While the above elaborations were centred on identifying regularities in the discursive field, a closer
look at changing inter-organisational practices and institutions shows how the latter have not only
inscribed themselves but also reshaped and transformed the field. Contemporary global health gov-
ernance is marked by the creation of super structures and large inter-agency activities geared
towards collaboration at all levels of policymaking and with very large mandates such as global
health funding in general or partnerships spanning maternal, newborn, and child health. In con-
trast, for example, the WHO/UNICEF Joint Committee on Health Policy of 1949 limited itself to
technical cooperation on selected issues, capacity building, and the sharing of knowledge between
the two organisations. This is one of a number of interagency committees with limited mandates
that were created with WHO at their centre.75 More importantly, in early inter-organisational col-
laboration among international agencies whose mandate included health, there was little reflection
on the broader effects of these selective interactions on the institutional architecture of the United
Nations or on international health governance overall. For UNICEF and, to a lesser extent, UNFPA,
there seemed to be no need to consider the implications of their collaboration on the mandates and
authority of the interacting organisations, with the centrality of WHO taken for granted. The same
dynamic has characterised interactions with the private sector for considerable time. In fact, con-
trary to what the literature on global governance invokes as a ‘new’ paradigm, international cooper-
ation in the field of health was, from the onset, marked by interactions with the private sector, in
particular philanthropies but also the pharmaceutical sector.76
An early, widely noted example of public-private partnerships for health is the Onchocerciasis
Control Program, a partnership to control river blindness established between WHO, World
Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and UNDP in 1974 that also involved
large-scale drug donations by pharmaceutical companies such as Merck and Co. During the
1990s and, particularly, under the leadership of WHO Director General Gro Harlem
Brundtlandt, though, WHO interactions with civil society and business actors skyrocketed, result-
ing in a wave of large public-private partnerships to control or eradicate a number of infectious
diseases, above all HIV and Malaria.77 The enthusiasm for these vertical partnerships and experi-
mentation with institutionalised interactions between IOs and private actors, however, started
waning by the mid-2000s. First of all, international health agencies, most notably the WHO,
slowly started to perceive of their relationships with private actors as requiring a legal basis –
a reasoning that has sparked off a recent trend towards the ‘legalisation’ of partnerships in the
form of Memoranda of Understanding between the partner institutions.78 Moreover, we can
observe how health IOs increasingly subscribe to a re-emerging health systems strengthening
agenda, thus being more and more concerned with the systemic effects of disease-specific initia-
tives and their long-term sustainability.79 Since then, therefore, a shift in perspective towards
75See, for example, the Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council: ‘Improving Effectiveness: Information Note’
(Geneva: WHO, 1992), p. 72; ‘The Work of WHO 1992–1993’ (Geneva: WHO, 1994), p. 71; the Children’s Vaccine
Initiative (Geneva: WHO, 1992), p. 113; (1994), p. 116, the Interagency Technical Tea; for Dracunculiasis (Geneva;
WHO, 1994), p. 92.
76See also Anne-Emmanuelle Birn, ‘Backstage: The relationship between the Rockefeller Foundation and the World Health
Organization, Part I: 1940s–1960s’, Public Health, 128:2 (2014), pp. 129–40.
77Jon Lidén, ‘The World Health Organization: Post-1990’, Public Health, 128:2 (2014), pp. 141–7.
78Bahr, Holzscheiter, and Pantzerhielm, ‘Understanding regime complexes through a practice lens’.
79Tamara Hafner and Jeremy Shiffman, ‘The emergence of global attention to health systems strengthening’, Health Policy
and Planning, 28:1 (2012), pp. 41–50; Balabanova et al., ‘What can global health institutions do’.
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health systems strengthening also serves to justify the deepening of inter-organisational ties and
the growing belief in the appropriateness of large-scale harmonisation activities, integrating indi-
vidual agencies’ and partnership actions into a broader ‘health architecture’.
Our discourse-analytical approach to studying inter-organisational relations in global health
rests on the proposition that to trace power in IO-IO relations it is insufficient to study merely
regularities and transformations at the level of discourse. Rather, it also emphasises the need to
expose the working of norms by looking at the ways in which such articulations are reflected in
patterned practices of inter-organisational cooperation. On a most general level, constitutive
inscriptions of the contemporary shift towards IO-IO harmonisation as a metagovernance
norm are manifested in the creation of numerous global initiatives whose purpose explicitly
lies in reducing the duplication of efforts and coordinating the actions of ‘different groups of
disease-specialists … under the same programmatic umbrella’.80 In 2010, Dina Balabanova
and colleagues counted 75 of these coordination-oriented partnerships.81 More specifically, we
see these inscriptions exemplified in the Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health
launched in 2005 (PMNCH).82 The decades prior to the establishment of the PMNCH were char-
acterised by tensions between the maternal and child health policy community, with ‘ideological
and programmatic differences’83 resulting in an increasing dissociation of these two health policy
agendas since the 1980s. As a consequence, advocates and experts for maternal health organised
around the Safe Motherhood Initiative established in 1987, thereby becoming insulated from a
broadly supported, but selective Primary Health Care agenda of which child health became the
most important pillar. The effect of maternal health’s divorce from child health was a growing com-
petition between the two policy goals and agendas. It was only the international debate on ‘aid
effectiveness’ that intensified in the early 2000s and the growing prominence of a vocabulary of har-
monisation, alignment, and order as a new normative horizon for the governance of governance in
health that led to the SMI turning to the idea of partnership with the child health community and
the formation of a larger, integrated umbrella organisation. As the insights presented by Katerini
Storeng and Dominique Béhague reveal, it was particularly the maternal health policy community
that felt pressurised by donors to coordinate and reconnect with the child health community for the
sake of reducing transaction costs and enhancing efficiency.84 Their findings are supported by other
studies85 on discourse and power in maternal and child health policy networks.86
The Health Systems Funding Platform (HSFP) provides another example of how the contem-
porary discourse on effective global health governance as ‘harmonized architecture’ continues to
inscribe itself into the practices and institutions that make up the global health landscape.
Following concerns of a number of important donor countries87 over fragmentation of funding
80Katerini T. Storeng and Dominique Pareja Béhague, ‘“Lives in the balance”: The politics of integration in the Partnership
for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health’, Health Policy Plan, 31:8 (2016), p. 2.
81Balabanova et al., ‘What can global health institutions do’.
82See WHO, ‘Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health, “History”’, available at: {http://www.who.int/pmnch/
about/history/en/} accessed 7 September 2018.
83Storeng and Béhague, ‘“Lives in the balance”’, p. 3.
84Ibid., p. 5.
85Lori McDougall, ‘Discourse, ideas and power in global health policy networks: Political attention for maternal and child
health in the millennium development goal era’, Globalization and Health, 12:21 (2016), pp. 309–20.
86Similar initiatives have also emerged among bilateral donor agencies supporting domestic health governance in devel-
oping countries. In 2010, the International Alliance for Reproductive, Maternal and Newborn Health was launched in
order to support country-led progress in reproductive, maternal, and newborn health. Partners in this Alliance are US
Agency for International Development (USAID), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), The
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. See USAID,
‘Alliance for Reproductive Maternal and Newborn Health’, available at: {https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/global-health/
family-planning/alliance-reproductive-maternal-newborn-health} accessed 6 September 2018.
87Among them, the UK as an initiator of deliberations in 2009; see David McCoy and Nouria Brikci, ‘Taskforce on innova-
tive international financing for health systems: What next?’, Bulletin of World Health Organization, 88 (2010), pp. 478–80.
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sources and systems related to health-systems strengthening, a High Level Task Force for
Innovative Financing for Health Systems was established. Its mandate was to identify a financing
mechanism that could complement traditional aid and ‘bridge the financing gaps that comprom-
ise attainment of the health-related MDGs’.88 Upon recommendation by the task force, a joint
Health Systems Funding Platform was established by the Global Fund, GAVI Alliance, World
Bank, facilitated by the WHO. The HSFP’s primary task was ‘coordinating, mobilizing, and chan-
neling health resources – from both domestic budgets and international aid - to comprehensive,
integrated, country-driven health plans and strategies’.89 Its creation can be understood as an
inscription of the harmonisation discourse, inasmuch as it was justified in line with the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, with the aim to ‘assure donors that their investments are
being used efficiently and effectively – in line with agreed development principles’.90 Both the
PMNCH and the HSFP are prominent, early examples of a concomitance of disease- or
problem-focused initiatives and partnerships, on the one hand, and a systemic perspective on glo-
bal health governance on the other that stimulated the creation of over-arching, yet relatively slim
institutional structures seeking to stabilise large-scale architectures for ‘funding’, ‘data’, and
‘women and children’ from the mid-2000s onwards. The continuous creation91 of such organisa-
tions has been driven by the health systems strengthening agenda, which demands a slimmer
funding architecture and places the oversight and management of huge funds into the hands
of only a handful of powerful global agencies. Rather than ‘economies of scale’, therefore, at pre-
sent the productive inscription of harmonisation as a metagovernance norm manifests itself in
the proliferation of such ‘alliances of scale’ as super networks. These material inscriptions of
metagovernance norms – embodied in people, buildings, infrastructure, funds, computers, tele-
phone calls, data repositories – are from our theoretical standpoint, an effect of institutionalised
meaning-structures that connect agents and organisations in the global health network. The
observable trend towards the creation of such super structures binding multiple IOs and public-
private institutions together, though, coexists with an ongoing proliferation of small-scale,
disease- or problem-specific partnerships and collaborations with for-profit and not-for-profit
actors. Contemporary global health governance, thus, is marked by normative instability and
ambiguity, reflected in the concomitance of two influential metagovernance norms – privatisation
and harmonisation.
Outlook: From regularities, transformations, and inscriptions towards struggle and
translation
In this article, we expanded the current understanding of power in IO relations by looking at dis-
courses surrounding reflexive norms that give meaning to the field of global health. As we have
shown, this policy field has undergone a series of remarkable changes with regards to substance
(What is global health?), actors (Who governs?), and norms (How should one govern? Who
should govern?). On all of these levels, a proliferation of issues, actors, and rule-systems has
led observers of the global health landscape to make routine diagnoses of fragmentation,
88World Bank, ‘Health Systems Funding Platform: Frequently Asked Questions’ (2010), available at: {http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTHSD/Resources/topics/415176-1251914777461} accessed 12 February 2019.
89Ibid.
90Ibid.; see also Scott S. Brown et al., ‘The health systems funding platform and World Bank legacy: The gap between rhet-
oric and reality’, Globalization and Health, 9:9 (2013), pp. 1–7.
91Other widely noted examples include the Health Data Collaborative, the UN Interagency Task Force on the Prevention
and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs), the Interagency Working Group on Reproductive Health in Crisis, as
well as the multi-stakeholder platform International Health Partnership for Universal Health Coverage 2030 (UHC 2030),
that was created in 2016 to promote ‘collaborative working at global and country levels’ with the ‘main purpose … to
help improve coordination to ensure the most effective approach to health system strengthening’, as well as its predecessor,
the International Health Partnership+; see UHC 2030, ‘International Health Partnership for UHC 2030 (UHC2030)’ available
at: {https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnership/?p=11941} accessed 12 February 2019.
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complexity, and competition. These changes thus have also affected the relationships between IOs
in this ever more prominent field of international collaboration. However, our qualitative analysis
of discourses on ‘good’ global health governance also allowed for identification of regularities in
discourse and practices, as well as historical moments and phases in which these patterns are bro-
ken and normative orders become unstable and shift. In particular, we found that contemporary
visions of good global health governance as orderly, coherent, and synchronised emerged quite
recently as a counternarrative to previously dominant beliefs in the virtues of partnerships, plur-
alisation, and innovation. Furthermore, as we illustrate above, these changes in metagovernance
norms and the broader discursive regularities in which they are embedded engraved themselves
into the field by shaping inter-organisational practices and giving rise to new institutional set-ups.
Our analysis of health IOs’ reflexive discourses on governance underlines the value of a dis-
cursive, productive perspective on power as it illustrates how, the ‘trans-actions of A and B cannot
be considered in isolation but rather always as part of wider networks of interdependent rela-
tions’.92 From such a perspective, the structural ramifications of relationships between two (or
several) IOs are of paramount interest inasmuch as these relationships constitute not only the
identities of the IOs involved but also affect social relations of other public and private organisa-
tions in the wider organisational field. In fact, our findings suggest that the adoption of a product-
ive understanding bears tremendous value for the study of IO-IO relations in global (health)
governance and beyond, as it permits conceptualising power in inter-organisational relations
as an ‘unfolding, ongoing process’.93 Most broadly, it permits us to draw a more comprehensive
and differentiated picture of the normative, institutional, and semantic orders that are constitutive
of contemporary global health governance in which agents are embedded and to denaturalise
dominant contemporary beliefs among both practitioners and scholars about how fields of global
(health) governance ought to be governed. In conclusion, this article has sought to show the ben-
efits of a discourse-analytical approach for grasping the productive effects of metagovernance
norms. In our diachronic analysis of IO discourses in global health, we sought to disentangle
the productive power effects of metagovernance norms and surrounding discourses along two
axes: first, by illustrating how metagovernance norms limit the imaginary of what constitutes
good ‘governance of governance’ at a particular place and point in time and, second, by showing
how discursive regularities underpin the (re)organisation, transformation, and emergence of
practices and institutional arrangements that bind IOs together in fields of global cooperation.
We believe that this research agenda could be advanced in several directions in order to draw
even more far-reaching conclusions regarding how the (re)production of normative, institutional,
and semantic orders of contemporary international relations are imbued with discursive, pro-
ductive power. In particular, we see the need to study discursive struggles over the meaning of
metagovernance norms and resistance against their enactment in domestic, operational, and
‘local’ contexts. Such an extended productive power approach to inter-organisational dynamics
would highlight how discursive regularities do not only (re)order organisational fields at large
as they transform over time, but that they are also open to contextually situated struggles, transla-
tions, and renegotiations. Against the backdrop of the discursive homogeneity and ambiguous
coexistence of incongruous metagovernance norms that our findings illustrate among global
health IOs, it appears particularly warranted to study struggles over the desirability and practical
implications of metagovernance norms in operational settings – including contestation by social
actors operating entirely outside of global health IOs’ discursive galaxy, as well as resistance and
translations that take place at the domestic, operational level. A 2015 Audit of the
Country-Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs) of the Global Fund, for example, was particularly
interested in coordination and alignment of the Global Fund and other international partners,
following a clear commitment to the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda. The Audit
92Selg, ‘Two faces of the relational turn’, p. 29.
93Ibid., p. 30.
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concludes, though, that while the norm of harmonisation is openly endorsed by the Global Fund
and its partners as something required and good, practice on the ground shows low compliance
with the norm and confusion over what it means for every interaction between agencies in the
field.94 Examining resistance, translation and local appropriation when metagovernance norms
‘travel’ from the global to the operational, ‘local’ level bears, we think, potential for examining
how productive, discursive power unfolds in struggles over the meaning and implications of
the powerful global discourse on ‘good’ governance of health governance that this article has
sought to interrogate.
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